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DIVORCE LAW IN ENGLAND
It is desirable that American students of law should study
the developments of the law relating to marriage, divorce and
matrimonial causes as it exists in England, and more particularly
consider the general tendencies of the law and the legislation on
the subject which came into force on January Ist of the present
year. For this reason-I was glad to accept the courteous invita-
tion of the Editor of this REviEw, extended to me a year ago,
to write something upon the subject for American readers, espe-
cially as I was officially connected with the Royal Commission
that reported on the subject in 1912. My brief paper has been
delayed by reasons beyond my control, but in fact the delay has
been useful as it enables me to summarize the effects of the new
legislation and also the new Rules of Courts affecting Poor Per-
sons seeking relief in matrimonial matters.
It would be impossible to understand the English law with-
out a brief historical retrospect. The early Christian Church
was faced with a Roman Society which, having abandoned the
old formal marriages (confarreate and coemptionate) after the
Punic Wars, had drifted into a condition of moral corruption
which made it possible for St. Jerome to record a case of a wife
who was married to her twenty-third husband, she being his
twenty-first wife. The official Christian Church-alter the time
of Constantine the Great-inevitably reacted from this state of
social affairs, but the Fathers differed on one special issue raised
by the New Testament texts: was re-marriage to be allowed after
divorce for adultery? St. Chrysostom (d. 407 A. D.) finally
held that adultery itself dissolved the marriage, while St. Augus-
tine (d. 430 A. D.) finally adopted the strict doctrine of the
indissolubility of marriage, each eventually holding the view orig-
inally held by the other. A century and a half later Justinian
imposed a new check upon marriage itself by the invention of the
doctrine of spiritual affinity (cognatio spiritualis)I which ex-
tended the bars to marriage implied in certain natural and
adoptive relationships to the affinities which were supposed to
arise from the relationship of godparent and godchild. This
Cod. 5426, and see Inst. Lib. i Tit. io, etc.
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played a part in the medieval history of divorce. It was not
until the twelfth century that the doctrine of the strict indis-
solubility of marriage was enforced in England by the Canon
law in the Court of the Bighop. * From that time onwards there
were in these courts two kinds of divorce:
(i) Nullity of marriage due to some initial impediment,
including spiritual affinity, which gave the right of
remarriage, and
(2) Divorce a iensa et thoro on the ground of adultery,
heresy or cruelty, which did not give the right of re-
marriage.
By the beginning of the sixteenth century in England a
canonical flaw could be found in almost any marriage, and re-
marriage was possible, while the issue of the first marriage was
legitimate, at any rate in the fourteenth century. Moreover, if
the marriage though invalid was not in fact dissolved, the issue
were legitimate and for this reason, since after the Reformaticn
a nullity suit had to be brought in the joint life of the spouses,
marriage with a deceased wife's sister was possible until the
passing of Lord Lyndhurst's Act in 1835.2 The Council of
Trent (563) reformed the Canon Law of Divorce, while the
Marriage Act of I54o 1 also in Protestant England. abolished the
scandal of pre-contracts and declared that consummated mar-
riages between lawful persons were indissoluble notwithstanding
any unconsummated pre-contracts of marriage. But pre-con-
tracts in England were revived in 1548 and were not fully abol-
ished until Lord Hardwicke's Act of 1753.1 A modified form
of the pre-contract still survives in Scotland if followed by con-
summation. In Scotland divorces a vinculo with a right of
remarriage were recognized by statute in 1563, and the statutory
right to divorce for desertion, which purported to declare a
common law right, followed in 1573 and is still in full force.
No such statutory relief was to be vouchsafed to England
until nearly three centuries later by the Matrimonial Causes Act
3 5 & 6 Win. IV, c. 54.
232 Hen. VIII, c. 38.
'26 Geo. II, c. 33.
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of 1857 ', but some relief was afforded by private Acts of Par-
liament dealing with individual cases-a practice that still obtains
in the case of Ireland, where marriage has always remained indis-
soluble. The Parliamentary practice began with the extremely
romantic case of Sir Ralph Sadler in 1545,0 a case so cruel that
Parliament had to interfere. But the mind of the Church of
England hardened against any other relief, and after the Restora-
tion of i66o the Legislature alone, acting ad hoc, could end a
marriage unless it was ended under those laws of nullity which
continued to make many marriages uncertain until, at any rate,
the year 1753. It was only from 1753 to 1857 that the doctrine
of indissolubility was really effective and incapable of any
evasion, save the evasion afforded to the rich by the Legislature,
and to all by the now closely limited law of nullity.
The Matrimonial Causes Act of i857,7 which provided the
law still in force, was introduced into the House of Lords by the
Lord Chancellor, Lord Cranworth, with the object of constituting
"a Court which should be competent to decree as a matter of
right that relief in favour of persons who had just matter of
complaint, which could now only be obtained by means of an
Act of Parliament." After much discussion it was passed by
both Houses, an effort having failed to amend the Bill by making
the position of a woman the same as that of a man with regard
to the grounds of divorce, and for making wilful desertion a
ground. The Act abolished all ecclesiastical jurisdiction in
respect to matrimonial causes and conferred all jurisdiction on
"the Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes," substituting a
decree of judicial separation for the old ecclesiastical divorce a
iensa et thoro (bed and board). The twelfth section enabled the
Court to sit in London or Middlesex or elsewhere as should be
from time to time appointed by the Privy Council In fact until
quite recently (with the exception of a few cases heard on assize
in i86o) the Court has only sat in London. Section sixteen
extended the old law that judicial separation might be granted
'20 & 21 Vict., C. 85.
'Pat. Roll 785, membrane i8; Parliament Roll 153 (19); 37 Hen. 8, c. 30.
Report of Royal Commission on Divorce and Matrimonial Causes (1912), App.
Ip. 9.
'Sepra.
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for adultery or cruelty to cases of desertion %%ithout cause for
two years or upwards. Relief in matters other than divorce
followed, in the main, the principles and rules of the old eccle-
siastical courts. By Section 27 a husband might present a peti-
tion for a divorce on the ground that his wife since the celebration
of the marriage had been guilty of adultery; and a wife might
present a petition for divorce on the ground of certain forms of
adultery or moral offences, or of adultery coupled with such
cruelty as without adultery would entitle her to a divorce a isensd
et thoro, or of adultery coupled with desertion, without reason-
able excuse, for two years or upwards.
As this Act of 1857 represents with comparatively small
amendments the law now in force, it is desirable to note certain
points of practice arising under the Act. The Court was diicocd
to dismiss the petition if it should find that the petitioner had,
during the marriage, been accessory to or conniving at the adul-
tery of the other party to the marriage or had condoned the
adultery complained of or that the petition was presented or
prosecuted in collusion with either *of the respondents. More-
over, if the case of the petitioner was proved and the petitioner
had not been found guilty of connivance with, or condonation of,
it, the Court was not to be bound to pronounce such divorce if it
should find that the petitioner had during the marriage been guilty
of adultery or if the petitionei should, in the opinion of the Court
have been guilty of unrensonablh delay in presenting or prose-
cuting such petition or of cruelty towards the other party to the
marriage or of having deserted or wilfully separated himself
or herself from the other party before the adultery complained
of, and without reasonable excuse, or of such wilful neglect or
misconduct as had conduced to the adultery. The large discre-
tion vested by this provision in the Court was unfortunately soon
after the passing of the Act of 1857 brought within narrow
limits. As recently as the year 192o a broader interpretation
was adopted in the case of Wilson v. IVilson 8 when the President
Sir Henry Duke (now Lord Merrivale) held that in exercising
the discretion the whole circumstances of the case, the interest
of the children and of all other parties should be taken into
' 192o] P. 20.
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account. On the other hand "this discretion is not to be exercised
eagerly or indeed readily, but with some degree of stringency."
The Act further enabled the husband to claim damages and costs
from an adulterous co-respondent. Section 57 provided that
after a decree dissolving a marriage became final it should be
lawful for the respective parties to marry again as if the prior
marriage had been dis-olved by death. But the Act went on to
say that no clergyman in holy orders was to be compelled to
solemnize the remarriage of the guilty party, but that if he refused
he should permit some other properly qualified minister to per-
form the marriage service in his church or chapel.
This famous Statute was amended in various matters as to
procedure, practice and the powers of the Court by Acts passed
(inter alia) in I86o, 1866, I868, 1873 and 1884. It is necessary
to refer very briefly to these as they affected the law as now in
force. By the Matrimonial Causes Act, i86o, 9 decrees for
divorce were not to be made absolute until after the expiration
of not less than three months (a period increased to a maximum
of six months in 1866)10 so as to provide a period of interven-
tion by the King's Proctor or other persons in which to show that
the decree nisi had been improperly obtained. It has been found
in practice that intervention by the King's Proctor and the con-
sequent rescission of a decree nisi is not infrequent. This prin-
ciple of intervention was extended to suits for nullity of marriage
in 1873.11 The Act of 1884 12 abolished the power of enforcing
a decree for restitution of conjugal rights by attachment but gave
the Court power to order provision for the wife by the husband,
and power to order a settlement to be made of any property of
the wife's for the benefit of the petitioner and the children of the
marriage, and also to order a reasonable part of any profits of
trade or earnings of which the wife was in receipt to be paid to
the husband for the benefit of himself and the children of the
marriage. The same Act provided that failure to comply with
a decree for restitution of conjugal rights was desertion without
'23 & 24 Vict., C. i44.
"29 & 30 Vict., c. 32, § I-
36 & 37 Vict, C. 31.
1 47 & 48 Vict., c. 68.
- 40
DIVORCE LAW IN ENGLAND
reasonable cause involving a sentence of judicial separation.
This provision had far-reaching consequences since such desertion
coupled with adultery enabled the wife to present her petition
for dissolution of the marriage. It is said, probably with some
reason, that the provision led to many divorces practically by con-
sent. The husband failed to comply with a decree for restitution.
Evidence of cohabitation at an hotel was secured, though in many
cases it was more than probable that there had been no adultery
in fact, and the decree followed as of course. In such cases
there was no collusion in any legal sense. The matter went
through by a tacit understanding. In quite recent times the
Court has met the evasion by insisting on strict and overwhelming
proof of actual adultery.
~s a result of the Judicature Acts of i872-- and
1875 14 the jurisdiction cf the Court was transfeiic d to the
High Court of Justice in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty
Division, which consisted of the President and one puisne
judge. Two puisne judges are now allotted to this Division of
the High Court in pursuance of Section 4 (I) (iii) of the
Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 19 2 5."' In
the large number of divorce suits in 1919 and 1920, that followed
the rash and hasty marriages which took place during the war of
1914-1918, the President and the puisne judge were assisted by
other judges of the High Court ald at least two ex-Lord Chan-
cellors. Arrears were rapidly overtaken and the present cause
list, in -iew ci the fall of the number of divorce uiuses (despite
the considerable number of "poor persons" suits), is normally
within the grasp of the President and his colleagues.28
U'36 & 37 Vict., c. 66, § 5.
14 38 & 39 Vict., c. 77..
is5 & 16 Ge. 5, c. 49.
"The figures rose from io75 in 1914 to 5o85 in igg, and 4481 i 192o. But
these figures included a large number (exceeding 2ooo in xgg) of the "poor per-
sons" suits. In 1923 the total number of divorce suits had fallen to 2591, and in
1924 to 2454 (see Judicial Statistics (passim).
It will be convenient to indicate for the three years 1922, 1923 and 1924 the
relative frequency of decrees nisi for dissolution of marriage and decrees for
judicial separation in England and Wales. The figures are contained in the Civil
Judicial Statistics for the years 1922, 1923, 1924 (Cmd 2ooi, Cmd 2277 and Cmd
2492). They are as follows:
Decrees nisi for dissolution of marriage: 1922. :455; 1923, 259!; 1924,
2454-
Decrees for juditial separation: 1922, .46; 1923, LG; 1924, 34.
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An innovation to which reference must also be made was
due to statutes which conferred powers upon the local magistrates
to deal with cases of separation between husband and wife in
certain events. The Acts were The Summary Jurisdiction (Mar-
ried Women) Act, 1895 17 and the Licensing Act, i9o2.18
Legislation in 1878 "9 and I886 20 had been passed to give pro-
tection to married women with respect to their maintenance and
safety, but these Acts were replaced by the Act of 1895 21 which
provided power to local magistrates to order reasonable mainte-
nance for the wife and infant children in cases where the husband's
cruelty or desertion had necessitated, or involved, separation in
fact. The order might provide (inter alia) that the applicant
should no longer be bound to cohabit with her husband, a pro-
vision having the effect in all respects of a decree of judicial
separation on the ground of cruelty. The Licensing Act, I9o 
2 2
moreover, gave powers both to a husband and a wife of applying
for an order under the Act of 1895 in case the respondent was
an habitual drunkard within the meaning of the Habitual Drunk-
ard's Act, 1879.-28 These acts have been widely used. In the
year 19o9, for instance, there were no less than 5227 separation
orders and 7120 maintenance orders. The Royal Commission
on Divorce and Matrimonial Causes of 1909 condemned the
system on the ground that a Superior Court was desirable in so
serious a matter, and that the ready opportunity for applications
for orders of this grave character by a Court of Summary Juris-
diction was undoubtedly likely to lead to hasty and ill-considered
action by the applicants. In fact, persons separated by such
In the years 1922, 1923 and 1924, respectively, 84, 26 and 47 decrees ntsi
were rescinded at the instance of the King's Proctor, so that the decrees absolute
were, in 1922, 2371 ; 1923, 2565; 1924, 2407.
In the same three years there were decrees nisi for nullity of marriage in
84, 59 and 46 cases, respectively. Three of these were rescinded at the instance
of the King's Proctor.
" 58 & 59 Vict., c. 39.
"2 Edw. VII, c. 28, § 5.
U41 & 42, Vict, c. xg
49 & 5o Vict., c. 52.
'Supra, note 17.
"Supra, note A&
= 42 & 43 Vict., C. 19.
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orders were found, possibly in 75 per cent. of the cases, to become
reconciled. The Royal Commission, moreover, found as a fact
that the result of such orders led in the case of men in numerous
instances (and to a less extent in the case of women) to adulter-
ous connections and general immorality.
Some reference must be made to the Royal Commission on
Divorce and Matrimonial Causes which was issued on Novem-
ber 8, 19o9 to
inquire into the present state of the law of England and
the administration thereof in divorce and matrimonial
causes and applications for separation orders, especially with
regard to the position of the poorer classes in relation
thereto, and the subject of the publication of reports of such
causes and applications; and to report whether any and what
amendments should be made in such law, or the administra-
tion thereof, or with regard to the publication of such re-
ports.
Lord Gorell, a former President of the Probate. Divorce and
Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, was the Chair-
man of the Commissioners who included the Archbishop of York,
various eminent lawyers and other persons, including one lady,
with special knowledge of working-class conditions: After an
exhaustive investigation of evidence on the subject, English and
foreign, the Commissioners reported on November 2, i912, a
Minority Report being signed by the Archbishop of York, Sir
William R. Anson and Sir Lewis T. Dibdin. The Minority Re-
port had many points of agreement with the Majority Report
for the reform of the existing law, but on the subject of the ex-
tension of the grounds of divorce there was a sharp conflict.
"The evidence, so far from showing any great or general demand
on the part of the poorer classes for divorce on other grounds
beside that of misconduct, very clearly proves the absence of any
such demand." The Minority Report met many of the real hard-
ships by agreeing with the Majority Report in a larger extension
of the principle of nullity of marriage, and it accepted the right
of re-marriage in cases where a Court had presumed the death
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of one of the parties to the marriage. The Majority Report rec-
ommended the decentralization of sittings for the hearing of di-
vorce and matrimonial cases to an extent sufficient to enable
persons of limited means to have their cases heard by the High
Court locally. This principle has since been put into operation
on the various assize circuits by the first section of the Admin-
istration of Justice Act, 1920.24
Secondly, the Majority Report recommended abolition of
the powers of Courts of Summary Jurisdiction to make orders
for the permanent separation of married persons; and, thirdly,
recommended the placing of men and women on an equal footing
with regard to grounds for divorce. This was the practice of
the old Ecclesiastical Courts; the principle was accepted in the
Minority Report; and, by the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1923,25 it
has now become part of the general law of the land. Hence-
forward any wife may present a. petition praying that her mar-
riage may be dissolved on the ground that her husband since the
celebration of the marriage and since the passing of the Act has
been guilty of adultery. A substantial grievance has thus been
swept away. The Majority Report also proposed the addition of
five grounds for divorce: namely, Desertion for three years and
upwards; Cruelty; Incurable Insanity after five years' confine-
ment; Habitual Drunkenness found incurable after three years
from the first order of separation; Imprisonment under com-
muted death sentence. The Minority Report opposed any ex-
tension of grounds for divorce. The Majority Report also pro-
posed the addition of various grounds for obtaining decrees of
nullity of marriage in certain cases of unfitness for marriage
(which were accepted by the Minority Report), and many
amendments of the law, procedure and practice in a number of
details, which were also accepted by the Minority Report. The
body of reform jointly advocated by both Reports would have
met practically all the grievances which to-day undoubtedly exist
in respect to matrimonial causes. The second Lord Gorell, im-
mediately before the War, introduced a Bill into the House of
1o & x Geo. V. c. 81, s. I.
13 & 14 Geo. V, c. 19.
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Lords incorporating the reforms common to the two Reports,
but the Bill had to be abandoned in view of the War and subse-
quent efforts in the same direction have received very little sup-
port.
Professional opinion on the subject is most outspoken. In
the second edition of Rayden's "Practice and Law in the Divorce
Division of the High Court of Justice and on Appeal There-
from," published in the present year, it is said that thirteen years
have elapsed since the Reports of the Divorce Commission and
with one exception, the placing of the two sexes upon an equal
footing as regards the grounds upon which divorce is granted,
effected by the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1923,26 the recommen-
dations of the Royal Commission "have not been given effect to
and the Court is still condemned to administer a system, in its
essential features unaltered for over sixty-eight years and now
in many respects at variance from public opinion." Neverthe-
less legal decisions have involved considerable variations in prac-
tice, and the measure of the change is seen in the fact that Ray-
den's very careful work on Divorce, originally published in igio,
has had, after the lapse of sixteen years, largely to be re-written.
Part VIII of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation)
Act, 1925,27 which came into force on January 1, 1926, has codi-
fied the substantive statute law of Divorce and Nullity of Mar-
riage, Judicial Separation and Restitution of Conjugal Rights
and kindred provisions, into comparatively brief space (Sections
176-200). The statute made no changes in the law, the main
provisions of which have been indicated above.
Certain points of general importance require some special
notice. The first is the question as to the persons who can find
a remedy for matrimonial troubles in the English Courts.
Briefly it may be said that in suits for judicial separation a de-
cree (if the evidence justifies it) can be obtained when the par-
ties to the suit were resident in England at the time of the
institution of the suit, even though the alleged offence has taken
place outside the jurisdiction of the Court. A different rule ob-
* Supra, note 25.
I5 & X6 Geo. V, c. 49.
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tains in the case of a suit for nullity of marriage. The Court
has jurisdiction when the marriage was celebrated in England.
or when both parties to the suit are resident in England at the
time of the institution of the suit, but it is not wholly clear if
there is jurisdiction where both parties are domiciled in but are
not both resident in England. The jurisdiction of the Court is
much more limited in cases of a decree for dissolution of mar-
riage. Such a decree involves a change of status and the Court
is, therefore, specially alive to the necessary or desirable limi-
tations of its jurisdiction. With certain exceptions no decree for
dissolution of marriage will be pronounced in England unless the
husband, and therefore the wife in English law, are domiciled in
England at the commencement of the proceedings. The Court
allows no variation from this rule. The parties cannot by con-
sent, either expressed or implied, confer upon the Court juris-
diction. In Admiralty cases the Court often accepts jurisdiction
by consent of the parties, and suits between persons of foreign
nationality are not infrequently heard. But no such practice
obtains in the case of Divorce. Two exceptions have, however,
been forced upon the English Courts to meet cases of manifest
injustice to persons of English birth. In the case of a deserted
wife, domiciled in England up to the time of desertion, the hus-
band cannot, by changing his domicil, drag his unfortunate wife
in search of a remedy from country to country. The English
Courts hold that in such a case a husband cannot be allowed to
assert in an English Court, for the purpose of evading the suit,
that he has changed his domicil. The other exception meets an
even harder case. If a woman domiciled in England marries a
foreigner domiciled abroad who afterwards, in his own domicil,
obtains a decree of nullity, though in England the marriage is
good, she is allowed in England, though she has in English law
the domicil of her husband, to present a petition for dissolution
of the marriage if due grounds exist. This practice sprang from
the notorious and hard case of Ogden v. Ogden.2 8 It should be
noted that if domicil is once established the Court has jurisdic-
tion, even if the marriage were contracted abroad, or if the par-
[x9o8] P. 46.
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ties w.-ere not domiciled in England at the date of the marriage;
and it is immaterial that they are not British subjects, that they
do not live here, or where the matrimonial offence took place.
Domicil at the commencement of the proceedings is the only test
of the jurisdiction of the English Court in the case of petitions
for divorce.
A rule in the law of evidence, the exclusion of evidence
by the spouses as to the possibility of access between them when
a child has been born, is regarded by some practitioners as bear-
ing "hardly upon the poorer litigant, who cannot afford to call
witnesses to prove absence from his wife when the child was con-
ceived." 28 This ancient rule was affirmed in 1924 by the House
of Lords in the case of Russell v. Russell3 0 The rule is based
upon the principle laid down by Lord Mansfield in 1770 in the
case of Goodright v. Moss 31 that "the law of England is clear,
that the declaration of a father or mother cannot be admitted to
bastardize the issue born after the marriage." The practice of
the Divorce Court since the case of Russell v. Russell 82 is that
affidavits containing allegations that a child born .in wedlock is
not issue of the marriage are subject to rejection if it appears
to the Registrar that they contravene the decision. In the case
of Holland v. Holland,33 it was held, however, that the rule does
not apply to a still-born child. Lord Dunedin in his judgment in
the Russell case was firmly in favour of the existing rule:
"A judgment the other way would, in my opinion, open
the door to gross abuse, put upon juries an almost impos-
sible task, do the very cruellest of wrongs to persons who
cannot lift a hand to protect themselves, and introduce into
the law an uncertainty based on inquiring into the details of
life which ought to be sacred between the persons concerned.
I am, therefore, unhesitatingly of opinion that the evidence
ought not to have been admitted, and that the verdict cannot
stand. To hold otherwise would be to open wide a door
through which in the sequel falsehood will enter oftener
than truth."
, See the Preface to the second edition of Rayden's volume on Divorce.[924] A. C. 687.
"2 Cowp. 591, 592, 594.
"Supra, note 30.
[1925] P. 1OI.
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It is to be noted that the old rule by which a guilty mother
must be forever deprived of access to her children is now finally
discredited." '
To the student of legal history the position of poor persons
or paupers in the search for justice is an interesting feature of
English law. It is clear enough from the Early (Mediaeval)
Chancery proceedings that the Chancellor would help a poor per-
son seeking justice, and by statutes i i Hen. 7, C. 12 (1495) and
23 Hen. 8, c. I 5 (I531-2) , pauper suitors were exempted
from the payment of any Court fees, were entitled to have coun-
sel and a solicitor assigned to them by the Court without fee, and
were in no case liable for costs. This system obtained in Eng-
land until January I, 1914, when new rules of Court came into
force which were designed to secure the preliminary investigation
of the legal claims of poor persons and to provide, as a system
organized by a special department in the High Court of Justice,
professional asiistance and representation for persons qualified
under the rules to sue or defend as poor persons. Under the
Tudor system in its original form the poor person had to swear
that he was not worth £5; the sum was increased to £25; today
it is £5o (or in exceptional cases £ioo) with an income not ex-
ceeding £2 (or in exceptional cases £4) a week. The 1914 rules
of the High Court gave way to rules that came into force in
April of the present year (1926) which are designed to supply
a thoroughly efficient system of dealing with the cases of poor
persons, and there is special provision for the conduct of Matri-
monial Causes. Divorce business can be dealt with by a Com-
missoner of Assize under the new rules at Birmingham, Cardiff
(or Swansea when the Glamorgan Assizes are held at Swansea),
Chester, Exeter, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Nor-
wich and Nottingham. It, therefore, may be said that no poor
person, husband or wife, who has real grounds for presenting a
" B. v. B. [1924] P. x76.
"These statutes were repealed by 46 & 47 Vict., c. 49 (i883), as the sub-
ject matter had been otherwise dealt with by rules under the Supreme Court by
Judicature Act, 1873, and the acts amending the same. The Scottish procedure
for persons suing in forui, pauperis rests on the statute of 1424, c. s, passed in
the reign of James I, of Scotland.
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petition for dissolution of marriage or other matrimonial relief,
is any longer stopped from obtaining relief by the fact of pov-
erty. The Law Society of London and the various Provincial
Law Societies are now responsible for the whole system of legal
relief for Poor Persons.
This reform is a very important one, but the Law of Di-
vorce and Matrimonial Causes generally in England stands in
need of the many reforms jointly indicated in the Majority and
Minority Reports of the Royal Commission of 1909-1912. Until
Parliament finds the time and the will to deal with these ques-
tions a considerable measure of justice is still withheld from a
number of the lieges of the Crown.
J. E. G. de Montmorency.
London, England.
